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 Abstract 
Over two centuries, Colombia transferred vast quantities of land, equivalent to the entire UK 
landmass, mainly to landless and poor peasants. And yet Colombia retains one of the highest 
concentrations of land ownership in the world. Why? We show that the effects of land reform on 
inequality and economic and human development were heterogeneous. On average, rural properties 
grew larger, land inequality and dispersion fell, and development increased across Colombia’s 
1100+ municipalities between 1961-2010. But pre-existing inequality counteracts these effects, 
resulting in smaller rural properties, greater dispersion, and lower levels of development. How? 
Land reform increased public investment in agriculture, raising consumption of public and private 
goods. But land concentration again counters these effects. Elites seem to have distorted local 
decision-making to benefit themselves. We conclude that land reform’s second-order effects, on the 
distribution of local power, are more important than its first-order effects on the distribution of land. 
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1.  Introduction 
Land is a key asset and factor of production, and has been so since pre-historic times. Even 
in the twenty-first century, land retains primary importance as a factor of production, store of 
wealth, and source of status. This is especially true in rural areas of developing countries. Influential 
studies have argued that land inequality leads to low agricultural productivity, low growth, high 
rates of poverty, and oppressive social relations (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995). Because 
of this, land reform has been promoted widely across the developing world as a remedy for high 
levels of inequality, and a tool for modernization and social development more broadly. And yet 
despite the large number of land reforms implemented across the world, and the many studies 
conducted, evidence for land reform’s effects on not just development but, more surprisingly, land 
inequality is decidedly mixed. 
This is especially notable as theory supports expansive views of land reform’s potential to 
affect not just rural incomes and output, but much broader economic, social and political relations. 
Land reform thus provides not just a set of interesting questions in itself, but a useful empirical 
setting in which to re-examine broader debates about some key factors thought to explain 
comparative development. Recent years have seen a powerful resurgence in the political economy 
literature on development. Ideas about, for example, the role of institutions vs. factor endowments 
vs. education in driving development have been advanced forcefully, and have been tested in a 
variety of contexts. But in our view this literature, rich and provocative as it is, has reached 
empirical limits in terms of its ability to identify and distinguish amongst complex, multi-
dimensional factors. Even if the institutional intuition is correct, “institutions” are too high a level 
of aggregation to produce empirical evidence that is clear and convincing, and then compare with 
alterative theses. And the cross-country studies on which most of this literature (e.g. Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001 & 2002) is based are heroic in both timescale and geographic scope. 
This leads to broad-brush assumptions that obscure the many fundamental ways in which countries 
differ, for which we have no good data and hence no credible statistical controls. And they produce 
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empirical findings that are similarly heroic, lacking in nuance, unable to distinguish between 
different aspects of the ‘institutions’ they seek to study. 
What is needed, instead, is an empirical approach that: (1) unpacks “institutions” into 
analytically distinct components that can be measured quantitatively, and (2) empirically tests the 
effects of these components on development with high-quality, detailed data, (3) in an empirical 
setting that is adequately identified. Once good way to achieve this is via ‘one-country, large-N 
analysis’ (Faguet 2012), using panel data from hundreds of observations across decades. When 
these units are subnational, the researcher can control for historical, macro-institutional, geographic, 
cultural, and other factors that are treated as exogenous in cross-country studies, and bedevil 
identification. The empirical quality and specificity of such an approach facilitates analysis that is 
rigorous and detailed, marked at its best by nuance and depth of understanding. 
This paper analyses one remarkable case of significant, sustained land reform: Colombia.  
Since independence in 1821, Colombia has implemented a nationwide land reform program based 
not on breaking up large farms, but rather distributing vacant publicly-owned land to both rural 
producers and landless and poor peasants. Since1901, Colombia granted 23 million hectares of land, 
equivalent to the total landmass of the United Kingdom, twice Greece, or six times Switzerland. 
And yet Colombia retains one of the highest levels of land inequality in the world, alongside 
striking disparities in regional and municipal development indicators. How can we explain this 
paradox? Focusing on the period 1961-2010, we investigate land reform in Colombia both to 
answer these questions for their own sake, and as a tool to begin to prise open the black box of 
institutions and institutional change. 
A first dimension of institutions examined here is the important issue of land rights and their 
distribution. Using an original panel database comprising 1100+ municipalities over 50 years, we 
distinguish between pre-existing distributions vs. land reform-induced allocations, and investigate 
the effects of the latter on plot sizes, land inequality, and indicators of development. We then 
explore the channels through which such effects might occur, disaggregating our development 
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indicator into its individual components, and focusing on public sector policies and investments. To 
our knowledge, this is the first quantitative study of land reform’s effects on local inequality and 
development in Colombia. 
Our analysis is predicated on the notion that land reform is not a simple policy instrument 
with mainly uni-dimensional (linear) effects, such as – for example – the decision to build a road or 
hire more teachers.  Land reform is, rather, a complex instrument that sets in motion important 
changes across many dimensions of a country’s economics, politics and society. It can be expected 
to have significant effects on not just agricultural productivity and output, but also on factors further 
afield such as the types and quantities of public services provided locally, political party 
competition, and the distribution of status and power in society, amongst others. 
These effects, furthermore, will not impact municipalities symmetrically, but will rather 
vary across them as much as municipalities are themselves different from one another. This is 
because in each relevant dimension under study, the effects of land reform depend on a 
municipality’s characteristics. Distributing land in a sparsely populated, flat, lowland region on the 
frontier that lacks large landowners is not the same as doing so in the mountainous central highlands 
where landed elites are well established. Vastly different initial conditions will lead to different 
outcomes, and different long-term development implications. Colombia’s descriptive statistics bear 
this out, as we shall see below. 
The main heterogeneity we focus on is the extent of concentrated landholdings in a 
municipality. We capture this through our measure of latifundia – large farms of 500 hectares or 
more – as a proportion of a municipality’s total rural cadastre, normalized in per capita terms. We 
expect land reform to have different effects in municipalities with high land concentration vs. those 
where land is more evenly distributed. In practice this proves strikingly true, and explains mixed 
results from two centuries of land reform in Colombia. 
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Table 1 provides simple descriptive statistics for Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN)
5
, the Gini 
coefficient of land ownership, the amount of land allocated by hectares, and potential land reform – 
a normalized proxy for allocable land that we explain in detail below – broken down into terciles by 
the degree of land concentration as measured by latifundia. The first tercile contains municipalities 
with the lowest levels of land concentration, and the third tercile contains the highest. We see that 
both UBN and the land Gini rise as we move up terciles, even as the amounts of land allocated or 
available for allocation rise significantly. The implication is that more land reform leads to lower 
municipal development – a surprising result – in a context of simultaneously increasing land 
concentration. Put another way, can land reform’s expected positive effects on poverty and 
inequality become negative where pre-existing land concentration is high? These are important, 
complex questions that cannot be answered with descriptive statistics, but require instead more 
rigorous econometrics. We return to them below. But table 1 does suggest something interesting 
here to investigate. More generally, heterogeneity along these lines may also explain contradictory 
evidence for land reform’s effects across other countries. 
Table 1: Unsatisfied Basic Needs, Gini, and Land Reform Summarized by Latifundia Terciles 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                 
5 An internationally standardized measure of poverty, or development. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1st Tercile Latifundia
UBN 282 38.285 16.989 7.122 100.000
Gini 2010 249 0.543 0.129 0.243 0.879
Allocated land ha pc 282 1.592 6.665 0.000 71.441
Potential land reform ha pc 282 1.772 4.201 0.015 60.831
2nd Tercile Latifundia
UBN 247 40.180 17.655 9.429 87.169
Gini 2010 227 0.632 0.100 0.339 0.876
Allocated land ha pc 247 3.915 12.747 0.000 145.668
Potential land reform ha pc 247 2.220 3.675 0.097 53.814
3rd Tercile Latifundia
UBN 263 46.756 18.601 8.689 100.000
Gini 2010 248 0.638 0.108 0.169 0.875
Allocated land ha pc 263 10.704 29.799 0.000 273.484
Potential land reform ha pc 263 5.548 15.132 0.085 215.998
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. A review of relevant literature is provided in 
section two, focusing on theoretical interactions between land reform, inequality, and institutions, 
and their effects on development. Section 3 explains the land reform process in Colombia, including 
key descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our data and methodology. Section 5 presents our 
results, and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Land Reform, Institutions and Development 
Our subject sits at the intersection of three large, interrelated literatures: land reform, 
inequality, and institutions, and the effects of each of these on development. These are big, rich 
literatures that we cannot pretend to summarize comprehensively here. In particular, we omit the 
many studies of land reform’s effects on agricultural investment, productivity, and yields as not 
directly germane to this paper. The following focuses on land reform’s effects on inequality and 
institutions, including a short section of Colombia-specific studies. 
Following Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (2012), we argue that land reform’s first-order 
effects concern agricultural output, productivity, profits, and tax revenues. These may tend to be 
positive, but will depend for their magnitude and even sign on a number of contextual and 
complementary policy variables. But land reform has a number of second-order effects too, and 
these are potentially more important. They operate via the changes land reform generates in 
underlying political and institutional relations, which in turn can powerfully affect opportunity, the 
distribution of income, and economic growth. In the short run, first-order effects are likely to 
dominate the balance of any particular reform.  But in the long run, such as the half-century we 
analyze for Colombia, second-order effects should be far more powerful and should easily 
dominate. The remainder of this paper, therefore, focuses on this indirect but more potent channel. 
2.1 Inequality 
Land reform’s second-order effects operate through the consequences of different 
distributions of land for political power and control of public institutions.  The key concept is 
inequality, and a large literature has grown up analysing its origins and multifaceted effects. Its 
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impacts, this literature argues, go far beyond conflicts over land or other asset classes, to economic 
growth and development more broadly.  Galor et al. (2003, 2009) show why, beginning from first 
principles. 
Capital and skills are complementary in a way that land and skills are not. Rising human 
capital increases output, productivity and profits in firms, as workers’ efforts are multiplied by 
greater capital intensity and more advanced technologies. This is good not only for workers, who 
are more productive and whose wages accordingly rise, but also for firm owners and managers, as 
profits increase. The same relationship does not hold for large landowners, however.  The nature of 
the agricultural economy is that increasing human capital raises the wages of agricultural workers 
faster than their productivity, and is thus a profit-decreasing strategy for large landowners.  Small 
landowners may support human capital investments that increase their off-farm income 
opportunities, as Gerbash and Siemers show (2010). But large landowners will tend to oppose them.  
This is especially true in latifundista-dominated polities, where the benefits of investments in public 
education and healthcare would be enjoyed by many but the costs borne by few.  In such places the 
few will oppose such investments, and will have the power to impose their will. 
Based on this logic, Galor et al. (2003) predict that public expenditure on education will fall 
as land inequality rises, and find empirical support in cross-state data from the early-20
th
 century 
US.  They also analyse the dramatic case of Korea, where major land reform was followed by a 
massive increase in public expenditure on education.  Between 1949 and 1950 family farms 
increased more than five-fold, from 349,000 to 1.8 million, while tenant farm households fell from 
1.1 million to virtually nothing. During the years that followed, government education expenditure 
soared from 8% to 15% of the total public budget.  Because of the complementarities between 
capital and human capital, capitalists were the prime beneficiaries of rising human capital amongst 
the masses. In contrast to Marx, the authors conclude that workers and capitalists are natural 
economic allies, and landlords the principle opponents of human capital investments, economic 
development, and social mobility in society. A country’s industrial elite would rather relinquish 
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power to the masses before permitting a landed elite to block development by blocking human 
capital investment. 
Nugent and Robinson (2010) use the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Guatemala to, in effect, test these ideas. All four countries displayed very similar initial conditions 
at independence: levels of development, colonial history, language, religion, climate, topography, 
factor endowments, technologies, and dominant export crops. But as they entered an export-led 
phase of rapid economic growth in the second half of the 19
th
-century, based largely on coffee 
(another shared feature), they adopted very different landholding structures. In Colombia and Costa 
Rica, coffee production was dominated by smallholder farms. In Guatemala and El Salvador, large 
coffee plantations became the rule.  This difference was mostly driven by different laws. Colombia 
and Costa Rica both passed laws similar to the US 1862 Homestead act, protecting smallholders 
and allowing them to gain title to land. In Guatemala and El Salvador, by contrast, powerful elites 
passed legislation at the onset of the coffee boom that facilitated mass land grabs.  Elites wrested 
lands from freeholders and indigenous populations, and converted them into large coffee plantations 
that used extreme labor repression. Coffee production requires significant investments, the authors 
point out, for which secure private property is essential. Both sets of countries achieved this, but in 
completely different ways. 
Different legal reforms were promulgated by very different kinds of elites. From the mid-
19
th
 century onwards, dominant elites in Colombia and Costa Rica were mainly commercial in 
origin, with interests in manufacturing, trade, banking, and the urban economy more generally. In 
El Salvador and Guatemala, by contrast, dominant elites were large landowners heavily invested in 
the agricultural economy and rural society. These different interests generated different priorities 
that affected much more than property rights. For example, Colombia introduced universal male 
suffrage in the 1850s; approximately 46% of adult males voted in the 1856 election, a figure high 
by any international standard of the time. The ultimate result a century later is per capita GDP in 
Colombia and Costa Rica roughly twice that of Guatemala and El Salvador, levels of human 
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development that are much higher, and institutions and practices of democracy that are far more 
robust. 
The micro-dynamics of land inequality blocking democratization are explored in much 
greater detail by Ziblatt (2008), who investigates the failed 1912 attempt to reform Prussia’s 
notoriously unequal 3-tier voting system.  This system divided the electorate by tax contribution, 
grossly over-representing the richest fifteen percent of the population compared to the bottom 85 
percent, in a way designed to ensure Conservative majorities. Legislation to adopt the one-man-one-
vote standard used elsewhere in Germany was debated but defeated in Prussia’s legislature, largely 
by representatives from constituencies with high land inequality, who were more likely to vote 
against – even controlling for income inequality. Ziblatt’s results echo Tocqueville’s (1835) 
analysis of the importance of small landholders to American democracy, and similar arguments cast 
in terms of the middle class and income equality by Moore (1966) and Boix (2003). Gerschenkron 
(1946) argues, further, that the unequal distribution of immobile assets, such as land, is a major 
impediment to democracy.  This effect is analytically distinct from, and more powerful than, 
inequality of wealth. 
The logic behind this is a combination of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model and the “special 
asset” idea. The former holds that democratization is an indirect fight over redistribution.  By 
involving a larger share of the population in the exercise of power, democratization increases the 
chances that a rich elite will be expropriated.  Hence the rich oppose reform.  Their control over the 
special asset, land, permits them to get their way. This is because land is both fixed and highly 
visible.  Unlike income inequality, land inequality underpins a particularly pernicious form of social 
power (Ziblatt 2008) that invests landowners with status and power in rural communities, giving 
them undue influence over public decision-making, and over the lives and – in extreme cases – the 
ideas and preferences of peasants.  Mobilizing peasants to support democratization in such 
circumstances can appear to the peasants themselves as a threat to their interests. Hence the unequal 
distribution of land dampens public investment in education and other forms of human capital, 
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undermines economic growth and development, sustains oligarchic rule, and represses 
democratization. 
2.2 Institutions 
New institutionalist theories of development, such as the seminal works of Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997, 2002), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001, 2002), are well known and so summarized briefly here before moving on to more recent 
contributions. Engerman and Sokoloff (henceforth ES) argue that the roots of comparative 
development of countries in the Americas lie in their factor endowments.  Areas with soils and 
climates suitable for high-value crops, such as sugar, developed highly unequal political and legal 
systems that supported plantation agriculture based on slave labor, for several centuries the most 
efficient means of sugar production.  These societies displayed severe levels of inequality in income 
and wealth, and systematic political exclusion of the masses. A similar story holds for mining areas, 
also based on slavery and forced labor. A third category of areas was sparsely populated, lacked 
minerals, and were not suitable for plantation agriculture. These were settled by Europeans, who 
engaged in smallholder, family-based farming. They developed far more participative political 
institutions and legal systems based on equality, and far more equal distributions of income and 
wealth. The path dependency of institutions means that patterns set early in the colonial experience 
explain economic and social outcomes to this day. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (henceforth AJR) construct a similar argument, but from 
a different starting point.  Because colonial lands had very different disease burdens, European 
considering emigration faced significantly different death rates.  They settled in large numbers, with 
their families, in areas where chances of survival were high.  These colonies developed politico-
legal institutions based on equality and participation, as above, and relatively equal distributions of 
wealth.  Where the chances of death were high, by contrast, few Europeans settled, constituting a 
tiny elite that exploited mineral wealth and plantation agriculture via slavery and forced labor.  The 
institutions that developed in these colonies were exclusive, exploitative, and highly unequal.  Once 
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again, institutional path dependency explains economic and social outcomes today.  Interestingly, 
this evolution involves a reversal of fortune in which the richest economies around 1750, based on 
sugar and mineral exploitation, are the poorest today, while poor economies founded on less-
productive smallholder farms are today the richest. 
These papers reinvigorated a historical-institutionalist debate that has proved extraordinarily 
fruitful.  Looking to explain Europe’s rise over the Islamic world and China during the early 
modern period, Stasavage (2014) examines the role of a distinctively European phenomenon: 
autonomous city-states. Autonomous city-states were controlled by merchant guilds, who provided 
greater political stability, more secure property rights, more training, and who more easily solved 
collective action problems, compared to princely rule. This, in turn, better supported long-term 
economic growth.  Over time, however, strong property rights and high barriers to entry strangled 
innovation, and city-state economies stagnated. Examining a similar period, AJR (2005) explain 
Europe’s sustained growth from 1500 onwards via the Atlantic Ocean trade, which promoted the 
emergence of political institutions that provided secure property rights to a broader segment of 
society, and allowed free entry into profitable businesses.  Such changes occurred in European 
countries with access to Atlantic trade, especially the Netherlands and Britain, but not elsewhere in 
Europe – including other trading states without access to the Atlantic. Their evidence shows that 
profits from the Atlantic trade were insufficient to drive sustained growth in the countries that 
benefited, but were big enough to change the distribution of power in society. We echo this 
argument in our analysis of land and development in Colombia below. 
Naritomi et al. (2012) also show institutional path dependency, with detailed subnational 
data from Brazil. In colonial sugar plantations, polarization between landlord and slaves defined 
social, economic and political structures; in gold mining settlements, the state established rentier 
institutions detached from the local population and unresponsive to local demands, focused on 
taxing extraction. These patterns determine current development outcomes: municipalities with 
origins in the sugar boom have more land inequality today, while those with origins in the gold 
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boom have worse governance practices and less access to justice. Both suffer lower provision of 
public goods. Bruhn and Gallego (2012) also explore colonial activities with subnational data, in 
their case from across the Latin American region. They divide the colonial economy into “Good” 
activities, characterized by low economies of scale and low population density prior to colonization; 
“Bad” activities, with high economies of scale and the heavy exploitation of labor, e.g. mining and 
sugar production; and “Ugly” activities, where large native populations were exploited in large 
operations that lacked economies of scale, relying on forced labor. Centuries later, areas with bad 
colonial activities have lower economic development, and areas with ugly activities lower 
GDP/capita, than areas with good or no activities. 
These are just a few of the many studies probing the long-term institutional determinants of 
both countries’ and subnational regions’ comparative development. They give a flavour of the 
recent outpouring of research in support of the idea that (a) institutional characteristics were set at a 
particular point in time – by factor endowments, the disease environment, or colonial powers – after 
which (b) these institutions determine levels and type of development. But the literature is not 
unanimous in its agreement.  A number of influential studies have begun to pick apart the 
institutional thesis, and some reject it outright. Coatsworth (2008) points out that ES’ reliance on 
natural resource endowments to explain differences in wealth between Latin America and North 
America has not held up well to scrutiny.  This is true both at the macro level: inequalities in 
resource endowments and wealth vary as much within as between the two regions, and at the micro 
level: grain estates in central Mexico historically produced similar mixes of crops and animals as 
farms in, for example, Pennsylvania. 
And the ways in which AJR and ES characterize inequality of wealth, rights, and political 
power in Latin America, Coatsworth points out, is simply wrong. Spanish and Portuguese colonial 
societies were less unequal, and settler elites far less powerful, than AJR and ES claim. Creole 
settler elites did not control indigenous peasants’ access to land, for example.  Surrounded and 
outnumbered by indigenous people and/or slaves, comparatively small elites had little choice but to 
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trade loyalty to the Crown for protection.  In the vast expanses of Spanish and Portuguese America, 
the authority of weak and distant monarchs depended as much on keeping settler elites insecure in 
their rights and properties as on suppressing discontent from below.  The institutions of early 
colonial society were more determined by this double imperative than by factors or diseases.  To 
take one important example, the New World’s legal system acted as a brake on growth not because 
it led to inequality, but because the law failed to define and extend property rights in a clear and 
coherent way, because the judicial process was very costly, slow, and thoroughly corrupt, and 
because it constrained the mobility of labor and capital by imposing a caste system (Coatsworth and 
Tortella 2002). 
Economic growth, when it began late in the 19
th
 century, required not inclusive institutions, 
but rather the exclusion of majorities from political power. This consolidated the dominance of 
desperately precarious elites, so promoting investment by those elites and by foreigners. As 
immigration kept wages low, growth greatly increased the returns to physical and human capital. 
And so the end of the 19
th
 century – when Latin America was finally growing, investing, and 
developing vigorously – committed the sins that both AJR and ES attribute to the colonial era: 
increasing inequality; government dominated by narrow elites; the exclusion of competing interests 
from power; poor property rights; and poor human rights protections. Far from impeding growth, 
Coatsworth (2008) argues, these institutional features accompanied and abetted growth and 
development. 
Exploring how Latin American income per capita fell so far behind the US, Przeworski and 
Curvale (2008) also reject the inequality/inclusivity theses. In 1700, and perhaps as late as 1800, 
Latin American income levels were similar to the US. By 2000 US income levels were five times 
greater.  What happened?  Focusing on the periods when Latin America first fell behind, and then 
resumed growth at levels similar to the US, Przeworski and Curvale identify as the key causal 
mechanism not inclusive or egalitarian institutions, but rather institutions that establish clear rule of 
the game that resolve conflict. Economies grow when political power protects economic power – 
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hence the importance of property rights – if conflict is efficiently dealt with. Political inequality can 
thus be consistent with healthy growth in the short term.  But it is inefficient in the long term when 
exclusion leads to political crisis, undermining the rules of the game and hence growth. 
Interestingly, they also point out that land inequality does not lead to economic inequality, or at 
least not in the same degree, where land is abundant and therefore cheap, as it was in the new world. 
But inequality persists even when the assets that gave rise to it change, implying that an initially 
benign inequality can, with time, become pernicious. 
2.3 Colombia 
A high-quality literature on land, inequality, institutions and development in Colombia has 
also emerged in recent years, mirroring key aspects of the debates outlined above.  Its findings are 
similarly mixed. 
Evidence on the economic effects of Colombian land reform is scarce. Assessing the land 
reform act of 1961, Balcázar, López, Orozco and Vega (2001) find that agricultural productivity 
increased but household income of beneficiary families fell – a troubling result that the authors 
cannot explain. Heshusius (2005), by contrast, finds positive effects on income from improved 
access to credit and work training of household members associated with reform. We know of no 
studies assessing the effects of reform on land concentration in Colombia. 
The background to any land reform, of course, is the initial distribution of land.  Countries 
that experienced colonization, like Colombia, have particular reasons for the high levels of 
inequality they subsequently experienced that are worth mentioning here. In the first phases of 
frontier settlement, land is super-abundant compared to the (settler) population. De jure property 
rights are rarely valuable enough to justify the cost of legalization – mainly survey, fencing and 
registration costs. Over time the returns to agricultural activity rise, and the costs of transforming de 
facto into de jure rights do become worthwhile (Dye and La Croix 2013).  But in the interim, the 
haphazard process of land grabs that defines de facto rights can easily degenerate into opportunistic 
accumulation by those with means or connections to power. 
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Colombia inherited a highly unequal distribution of land from the Spanish crown.  
Additionally, many land rights granted during the chaotic first decades of independence were poorly 
defined both in space and in law. The malign combination of inequality and poor definition drove a 
long history of conflict over land in Colombia, stretching back at least as far as the early 19
th
 
century.  Land conflict, Sánchez, López-Uribe and Fazio (2010) show, was sufficiently severe and 
sustained that it repressed Colombia’s economic development and integration with the world 
economy.  During the country’s first century of independence, successive governments were aware 
of this and implemented important land reform legislation favoring smallholders in the 1820s, 1874, 
1882, and 1912.  But high titling costs prevented most peasants from acquiring the titles to which 
they had rights; additionally, many were actively blocked by large landowners from acquiring titles, 
or usurped once they had. “Terratenientes were powerful and used every tool at their disposal to 
prevent land titling to peasants” (Sanchez et al. 2010: 380).  In these ways, land inequality stifled 
Colombia’s development. 
By contrast, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between land inequality in 
the 19
th
 century and current levels of economic development. Their earlier, more limited foray onto 
this paper’s terrain exploits variation across municipalities within the Colombian department of 
Cundinamarca. Their result contradicts the negative relationship ES (and arguably AJR) imply. 
Likewise, Galán (2011) shows that municipalities in Cundinamarca with more unequal landholdings 
in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries have higher education levels, lower poverty, and more public goods 
provision today. These findings are echoed by Dell (2008), studying modern development outcomes 
amongst districts in Peru and Bolivia that did vs. did not suffer the mita forced labor system under 
colonial rule.  Mita districts have lower household consumption, lower levels of education, and less-
developed road systems than those that did not. 
All three studies suggest that politics played an important intermediating role.  The colonial 
government restricted the formation of Spanish latifundias in mita districts.  Because latifundistas 
typically lobbied for more provision of public goods, mita districts lacked prominent advocates, and 
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so were exploited in the short term and languished in the long term. And in Cundinamarca, the large 
majority of national and local politicians were large landowners. Hence municipalities with more 
large landowners had more powerful voices to demand, and more interested politicians to provide, 
public investments that stimulated long-term development there. The role of such advocates is 
especially important because, as Acemoglu et al. (2015) point out, the Colombian government 
routinely provided very few public goods before the 1930s.  The state maintained a very uneven 
presence throughout Colombia’s territory, with order at the center and a more arbitrary, primitive 
sort of power punctuated by chaos and violence across much of the periphery (O’Donnell 1993, 
Robinson 2013).
6
 
2.4 Discussion 
To a greater degree than in Europe or North America, localities abandoned by the state in 
Colombia and many other developing countries defined a stark “internal frontier” (Fajardo 2002, 
Machado 2013), creating wide disparities in long-term development across space (Boone 2012, 
LeGrand 1986). Might land reform be part of a solution? Viewed from the perspective of its 
second-order effects, can land reform catalyze a shift from a patrimonial to a liberal local order 
(Kohli 2004), or from closed to open-access institutions and organizations (North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009), by empowering peasants who lack land, and hence voice and rights? By endowing 
the poor with this “special asset”, could land reform alter the distribution of local political power so 
as to help peasants claim not only higher incomes, but greater voice and more rights? 
Such questions are theoretically complex, methodologically difficult to approach, and – we 
feel – ultimately unanswerable via cross-country empirical work. This is because the mechanisms in 
question are both subtle and complicated, while cross-country evidence operates at a high level of 
aggregation, and – of necessity – makes numerous simplifying assumptions about important 
contextual factors that we should expect to affect key results. To rigorously analyze the 
                                                 
6
 Boone (2012) argues that the uneven reach of the state in Latin America and Africa is often 
intentional, serving specific political purposes, rather than being evidence of state failure. 
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interrelationships between land reform, inequality and institutions, we must drive our analysis 
deeper, towards clear relationships amongst well-defined, well-measured, discrete variables. 
One good way to specify and then test empirical relationships of this nature is to go down to 
the subnational level and conduct a “large-N in one country” analysis. By exploiting the significant 
variation amongst Colombia’s 1100 diverse municipalities, we can avoid problems of cross-country 
comparison (e.g. different institutions, political regimes, idiosyncratic shocks) while still benefitting 
from the formal rigor of large-N studies. And we can retain a central focus on complex, nuanced 
explanatory factors that are hard to treat in a cross-country context. In the best case, we may 
approach explanations that benefit from both generality and deep understanding. 
Section four presents our methodology for doing so.  But first we discuss land tenure and the 
history of land reform in Colombia. 
3.  Land Tenure and Land Reform in Colombia 
Land is distributed highly unequally in Colombia, with a concentration of ownership 
amongst the highest in the world. For two centuries, land inequality has been closely linked to rural 
poverty and the economic exclusion of the rural population (Acemoglu et al. 2008, Gutiérrez 2010, 
USAID, 2010). This largely explains Colombia’s long-standing program of land reform. But high 
concentrations of landholding and large estates – latifundia – have nonetheless endured to the 
present. 
As mentioned above, the distribution of land in Colombia is deeply rooted in its colonial 
experience and the 19
th 
century expansion of the agrarian frontier. During the colonial period, large 
properties emerged from the system of encomiendas established by the Spanish Crown. 
Encomiendas were royal grants that allowed the (Spanish) holder, the encomendero, to extract 
tribute and labour from indigenous people living in a particular area, in exchange for protecting and 
Christianizing them. Technically the encomienda did not assign ownership, but rather an inheritable 
right to use a piece of land. In practice, however, encomiendas were treated as private property, and 
were eventually transformed into latifundia – great estates – when landlords formalized their titles. 
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At the same time, other Spanish and criollo farmers received smaller plots from the crown, creating 
an unequal, two-tiered initial distribution of land. Over time, the latter category grew steadily as 
Spanish-indigenous mestizos grew from a negligible share of the population to become the majority.  
Initially outsiders, their clamour for inclusion in the country’s legal and economic life was assuaged 
through the sale of public land by the crown. As colonial encomiendas gave birth to latifundia,
7
 
colonial indigenous reservations, resguardos, gave rise to small estates, minifundios, in particular 
regions, when communal lands were privatized to surviving indigenous populations (Ankersen and 
Rupert 2006, Colmenares 1997). As the indigenous population declined, many mestizos took 
matters into their own hands, invaded resguardos, and seized their land. 
Colombia was born bankrupt. The government redeemed debts accumulated during the war 
of independence by transferring public lands to private bondholders, and so a sort of land reform 
began at independence in 1821. More broadly, the defining characteristic of Colombian land reform 
is the transfer of publicly held land to landless or poor agricultural workers able to demonstrate that 
they have been squatting on vacant public lands (baldíos) for some years. Unlike other cases, such 
as Mexico or Bolivia, less than one-half of one percent of total land distributed was confiscated or 
purchased from large landlords. Hence the large estates at the top of the land distribution remained 
mostly unchallenged through two centuries of land reform. But at the same time, vast quantities of 
land were distributed to peasants. 
The total area of Colombia is 110 million ha. About 32 million ha are designated indigenous 
reservations, and 60 million hectares are registered as privately held property. Figure 1 provides a 
more detailed breakdown. Between 1901 and 2012, the state granted nearly 23 million ha of land to 
                                                 
7
 The relationship between proportion of latifundia in a particular municipality in 1961 and the 
structure of the colonial institutions can be established through the following equation: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑜/𝑀𝑢𝑛_𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎1961 = 3.31 + 0.012 ∗ log(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠)1560 − 0.2 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 −
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠.  N=634, R2=0.16. 
All variables are significant at the 1% level. The equation suggests that the formation of latifundia 
was affected by two forces: a positive one driven by the availability of labor, and a negative one 
driven by the larger availability of land away from indigenous settlements. In the latter, it was 
observed the emergence of Resguardos and in the 19
th 
 century when they were dissolved it 
followed the propagation of minifundia. 
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peasants and agricultural businesses in over 565,000 plots. This is equivalent to 20% of Colombia’s 
total area, and one-third of all privately held land. To put this in perspective, over the past century 
Colombia has distributed an amount of land equal to the total area of the United Kingdom, 
Romania, or Ghana, about twice the area of Greece or South Korea, six times the size of 
Switzerland, and seven times the size of the Netherlands. As for any country, land reform in 
Colombia has its own characteristics, which cross-country comparisons must take into account. But 
there is no denying that reform has happened, and on a huge scale. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Colombian Land  
 
During the 19
th
 century, land reform legislation focused on raising funds to pay off public 
debts and fomenting a land market. Towards the end of the century, more emphasis was placed on 
promoting agrarian development and enhancing the efficient use of land. During the 20
th
 century, 
the focus shifted again towards resolving rural conflicts over land ownership and use. Law 200 of 
1936 defined for the first time the social function of property, and weakened individual rights over 
land in order to strengthen squatters’ rights. Subsequent land distributions increased modestly from 
the very low levels of the previous decades. 
But it was not until seminal Law 135 of 1961 that land reform in Colombia went into high 
gear. Seeking to pacify and develop rural areas, improve domestic food supplies, and respond to 
foreign pressures such as the Alliance for Progress, the law increased distributions from about 
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90,000 to 600,000 ha per year; the number of beneficiaries more than sextupled. Land distributions 
slowed after 1973, and then increased again in the1990s as a result of institutional changes 
associated with the 1991 Constitution. Shifting gears again, Law 160 of 1994 promoted a market-
oriented approach to land reform that sought to lower the cost of land for poor peasants, and 
provided publicly-subsidized loans. Mondragón (2001) shows that peasants’ access to land 
decreased as a result of this last law. 
Figure 2 provides time series data on yearly distributions in area and number of plots. Figure 
3 shows the distribution of land grants in hectares between 1961-2012 by size. Interestingly, the 
largest two categories are the modest 20-200 ha range, and the larger >500 ha range. It is important 
to note that even a 200 ha farm, while not small, is not large by Colombian or Latin American 
standards; we define latifundia, or large landholdings, as properties of 500 ha or more. Also, none 
of the laws discussed above provided full property titles per se, but rather Administrative 
Resolutions of land allocation to a private party. Obtaining full title thereafter was a straightforward 
process, but entailed nontrivial costs that many beneficiaries preferred not to incur. 
Figure 2: Land Distributions in Area (Ha) and Plots, 1901-2012 
 
Source: Information System of Rural Development, SIDER-INCODER; Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 3: Land Allocation (ha) by Plot Size, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Rural Development Information System SIDER-INCODERS. 
After over 100 years of land reform a la colombiana, two facts stand out: (1) the magnitude 
of reform has been significant, both in terms of the quantity of land distributed and the number of 
people benefiting; and (2) land inequality, and high levels of land concentration, have not 
decreased. As Helo and Ibañez (2011) point out, 42% of private land is concentrated in large 
properties of more than 200 ha, and the Gini coefficient for land reached 0.863 in 2009. Latifundia 
remain a significant feature of the Colombian countryside, and have recently increased in size 
(Mora and Muñoz, 2008). One century and 23 million ha later, the broad structure of landholding 
inherited from the Spanish – a small number of large landowners and a large number of small 
landowners – remains. 
4.  Data and Methodology 
We examine the effects of land reform on municipal-level development and land inequality, 
focusing on its differential effects in the presence vs. absence of latifundia.  We then explore 
possible mechanisms by which the concentration of landownership might cause land reform’s 
effects to vary. We focus on the period 1961-2010 for two reasons: (1) although we have very 
detailed data on land reform going back to 1901, data on our dependent variables is only available 
at municipal level from 1973 onwards; also (2) the pace of land reform increased significantly with 
0.73% 
2.65% 
4.39% 
44.42% 
11.95% 
35.85% 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
< 3 has 3 -10 has 10 - 20 has 20 -200 has 200 - 500 has >500 has
  
21 
Law 135 of 1961, as mentioned above, and so the latter half-century is where one would expect to 
find the most important effects. 
4.1 Data 
Our database combine historical data from several sources. Land reform data comes from 
the Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER
8
), which provided individual-level data 
on plots and areas allocated in each municipality between 1961-2010. Data on UBN comes from the 
National Statistics Department, and varies between 0, when all basic needs are satisfied, and 100, 
when they are unsatisfied. Our land Gini coefficients of plot sizes and values are constructed for 
each municipality using rural cadastral data from the Augustín Codazzi Geographic Institute 
(IGAC) for 1985, 1993, 2005 and 2010. Average plot size and the coefficient of variation of plot 
sizes are constructed from the same data, as are distributional data on plots by various ranges of 
size. Lastly, variables for the extent of latifundia and its share of the total rural cadastre are 
calculated from IGAC data from 1960. Latifundia are defined as properties of 500 ha or more. All 
per capita values are calculated using lagged population data from the national census.
9
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our estimations. We see that 
land reform has taken place in almost all Colombian municipalities, and the average size of rural 
properties is 47 ha. Average land inequality is high, at 0.69, and in some municipalities reaches 
extremely high values of 0.98 for both plot size and value. Probing the data deeper,
10
 we see that 
medium size properties account for about 40% of rural land, latifundia for 37%, and small 
properties for 33%. The average municipality in 1960 had 13,445 ha of latifundia, representing 14% 
of rural property. But dispersion is very high, with latifundia in 1960 ranging from 0 ha to as much 
as 1.45 million ha and 98.8% of all land in a municipality. 
                                                 
8 Acronyms of Colombian institutions are given in the Spanish original. 
9 Population growth might credibly be driven by the reality, or prospect, of land allocations in a 
municipality. 
10 Simple calculations omitted for parsimony. 
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 Table 2: Summary of Variables 
 
4.2 Methodology 
To determine the effects of land reform on development and inequality, we would like to 
estimate 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾1PLRpc𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 PLRpc𝑖𝑡 ∗ L1960𝑖 + 𝛾3L1960𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
Variable Obs Mean Std.	Dev. Min Max Years
UBN 4484 62.17 22.96 5.36 100.00 1973-2005
Gini	Coefficient	of	Plot	Sizes 2155 0.69 0.11 0.02 0.98 2005-2010
Gini	Coefficient	of	Plot	Values 2127 0.67 0.09 0.18 0.98 2005-2010
Average	Size	of	Rural	Properties	 3937 47.13 81.24 1.50 1000.00 1985-2010
Average	Size	of	Rural	Properties		(Log) 3937 3.10 1.22 0.41 6.91 1985-2010
Coefficient	of	Variation	of	Plot	Sizes 3937 3.26 1.40 0.00 10.24 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	Less	than	3	ha 2139 1425.03 1658.75 0.00 14070.32 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	3-10	ha 2139 2851.30 2629.76 0.00 20336.30 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	10-20ha 2139 2786.41 2644.75 0.00 27272.94 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	20-200	ha 2139 16087.78 22947.71 0.00 377095.60 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	200-500	ha 2139 5074.73 10335.81 0.00 111403.50 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	>500	ha 2139 10812.07 67348.33 0.00 1403169.00 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	Less	than	3	ha	percapita 2129 0.14 0.19 0.00 1.44 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	3-10	ha	percapita 2129 0.27 0.35 0.00 7.38 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	10-20ha	percapita 2129 0.24 0.44 0.00 16.99 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	20-200	ha	percapita 2129 1.19 2.22 0.00 78.69 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	200-500	ha	percapita 2129 0.38 0.90 0.00 11.76 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	>500	ha	percapita 2129 0.84 5.56 0.00 95.15 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	<3	ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.89 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	3-10	ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.21 0.20 0.00 2.13 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	10-20ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.20 0.18 0.00 2.89 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	20-200	ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.63 0.51 0.00 4.38 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	200-500	ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.23 0.35 0.00 2.55 1985-2010
Plots	by	Size	Ranges	>500	ha	percapita	(Log) 2129 0.22 0.52 0.00 4.57 1985-2010
Allocated	land	hectares	pc	(Log) 5542 1.40 6.90 0.00 223.58 1973-2010
Allocated	land	hectares	pc 5542 0.38 0.68 0.00 5.41 1973-2010
Potencial	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	 5479 4.10 39.47 0.00 1166.22 1973-2010
Potencial	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	(Log) 5479 -0.99 1.46 -6.52 7.06 1973-2010
Latifundia	in	1961	hectares 4125 13444.68 71114.39 0.00 1450956.00 1961
Latifundia	in	1961	hectares	pc 4075 6.42 71.85 0.00 1804.15 1961
Latifundia	in	1961	hectares	pc	(Log) 4075 0.56 0.91 0.00 7.50 1961
Latifundia	Share	of	rural	cadastre	(ha,	1961) 3960 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.99 1961
Average	Proportion	allocated 5605 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.54 1973-2010
Lower	ninety	five	percent	of	owners 1767 0.34 0.08 0.02 0.66 2005-2011
Lower	fifty	percent	of	owners 1769 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.63 2005-2012
Highest	ten	percent	of	owners 1767 0.59 0.11 0.18 0.98 2005-2013
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where dependent variable y represents development and inequality outcomes of interest. We use 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) as our key measure of development; as measures of land inequality 
we use the land Gini coefficient of plot sizes and values, the average size of rural properties, and the 
coefficient of variation of plot sizes. Variables 𝛿 and 𝑑 are municipal and year fixed effects, 
respectively. L1960i is per capita latifundia (larger than 500 hectares) in 1960, previous to the land 
reform of 1961, capturing the relative size of large landholdings in municipality i. This variable 
captures the prevalence of latifundia, and the relative power of the landed elite in a municipality 
prior to land reform. The Area term is a scalar or vector of first and second-degree polynomials of 
municipal area interacted with time fixed effect d, which permits a reduced-form control for the 
direct effect of land availability on local development and land distribution. And 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term. All variables are subscripted by municipality i and year t. 
Our key policy variable is land reform. But we cannot introduce simple indicators of land 
reform (plots, ha, or per capita) as regressors in this equation because of the endogeneity bias that 
would result. As land reform policies have aimed to reduce poverty, improve land inequality, and 
increase rural development, it is likely that land reform actions at the local level have been largely 
driven by poverty and inequality. Naïve OLS estimates would thus produce biased estimators. To 
correct for this, we construct an exogenous measure of land reform called Potential Land Reform 
per capita, PLRpc. This variable distributes the total land area allocated each year in Colombia in 
proportion to each municipality’s area, correcting the latter for previous years’ distributions. To 
construct PLR, we first calculate Potential Land Allocable: 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 
Corrected area captures the total area of the municipality corrected by previous land allocations. 
The correction involves two steps: (i) for each municipality, an area is discounted equal to its 
proportional share of national allocations (not real allocations there); and (ii) areas are corrected 
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only in municipalities where actual allocations took place between years t-1 and t. Our concept of 
land allocable for land reform is thus based on national, and not local, trends. Corrected municipal 
area is defined as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 − (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡,𝑡−1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1  
Potential Land Reform per capita is thus defined as municipality i’s total allocable land 
summed between 1961 and year t, expressed in lagged per capita terms: 
𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 =  ( ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑡
1961
) /𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1. 
It can be interpreted as the intensity of the intent-to-treat, given national land reform trends and the 
quantity of land available in a particular municipality. Figure 4 shows correlations between actual 
and potential accumulated hectares of land reform for 1973 and 2010. We see that Potential Land 
Reform is a good, but not perfect, predictor of real land reform – a desirable characteristic for an 
exogenous proxy. 
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Figure 4: Potential and Actual Land Reform Allocations 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
We expect the coefficients on PLRpc to be negative for estimates of poverty or land 
inequality, implying that land reform benefits poorer populations and improves the distribution of 
land – i.e. the first-order effects of land reform obtain.  Land reform’s second-order effects, 
operating through changes in political power and public institutions, should over time increase these 
trends.  We test these ideas in a second set of estimations, explained below. We expect the 
coefficient on latifundia to be positive for both poverty and land inequality, in accordance with the 
literature reviewed above. This implies that where land is highly concentrated, elites are able to 
either capture land reform for their own benefit, or capture local institutions in ways that benefit 
them at the expense of the poor. In such places, the positive effects of land reform will be 
undermined. Following the same logic, we expect the coefficient on the interaction of PLRpc and 
latifundia to be positive for both as well. 
Our specification is parsimonious, with few controls. We omit other commonly-used 
controls, such as indicators of education, health, and tax revenues, or political and violence 
variables, due to probable endogeneity and/or multicollinearity. We estimate for 1100 
municipalities over the period 1961-2010. 
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In order to investigate the deeper mechanisms by which any effects identified in equation (1) 
occur, we further estimate a variation of (1) substituting dependent variable pit for yit, where pit 
denotes individual components of UBN, such as the proportion of people with inadequate housing 
or public utilities. We interpret these as indicators of poverty that are particularly susceptible to 
public policy. We also estimate 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝜁𝑖 + 𝛾1PLRpc𝑖 + 𝛾2 PLRpc𝑖 ∗ L1960𝑖 + 𝛾3L1960𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝒁𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖 , (2) 
where e is different measures of local agricultural expenditure in municipality i, ζ  are department 
and regional fixed effects, Z is a vector of standard geographic controls, and remaining variables 
are defined as above. Due to a lack of time-series data for local expenditure, we estimate this 
equation as a cross-sectional regression. The logic of both sets of regressions is to investigate how 
land reform and latifundia interact to affect the sorts of local policies that might accelerate local 
development and reduce poverty. In other words, how are rural elites are benefiting from land 
reform in areas where they predominate? Are local public policies systematically different in such 
municipalities, compared to those where land is not concentrated? 
5.  Results: Land Reform, Latifundia, Inequality and Development 
Inequality 
How did land reform affect inequality? Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 show that land reform 
decreases the Gini coefficient of plot sizes and plot values; both coefficients are significant at the 
one percent level. The land reform-latifundia interaction term is insignificant in both equations. 
Model 3 shows that land reform increases the average size of rural properties, a result significant at 
the one percent level. But the land reform-latifundia interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant also at the one percent level, implying a countervailing effect. Model 4 shows that land 
reform decreases the coefficient of variation of plot sizes – a measure of the dispersion of overall 
landholdings. The land reform-latifundia interaction term is again statistically insignificant. 
Additional control variables for area, a simple latifundia term, and municipal fixed effects are 
included, all of which behave as expected. 
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These results imply that land reform in Colombia decreased inequality in landholdings 
between 1961-2010.  The estimated effect of a one-log-unit increase in land reform (in hectares per 
capita) is a reduction of 0.02 points of the land Gini. Keeping in mind that the Gini ranges between 
0 and 1, this effect, though not very large, is significant. Put another way, an increase of one 
standard deviation in land reform decreases the Gini coefficient of plot sizes by 0.029 points 
(=1.46*0.02), equivalent to 27 percent of its standard deviation, or four percent of its mean. 
Interestingly, the presence of concentrated landholdings – and the rural elites they imply – do not 
seem to affect either measure of land inequality. Our indicator of dispersion shows a similar pattern. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in land reform decreases the coefficient of variation by 0.31 
units, equivalent to nine percent of its mean or 22 percent of its standard deviation. 
Land reform also affects the average size of landholdings, but here the effect is positive. An 
increase of one standard deviation in land reform increases average plot size by 0.27 log units, or 
1.31 ha; this is equivalent to nine percent of its mean, or 22 percent of its standard deviation. The 
presence of latifundistas, however, mostly counters this effect. Our results suggest that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the interaction term decreases the average size of rural properties by 
0.09 log units (=0.056*1.53), equivalent to 1.09 ha, three percent of its mean, or seven percent of its 
standard deviation. The concentration of landholding thus counteracts most of the beneficial effects 
of land reform on average plot size. 
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Table 3: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Land Inequality 
 
Table 4 probes the distributional effects of land reform further by estimating its effects on 
per capita landholdings across various size categories. We see that land reform increases 
landholdings in all of the size categories except the largest, corresponding to latifundia. The biggest 
coefficient is for the 20-200 ha range, followed by the 3-10 ha range. All of these coefficients are 
significant at the one percent level. But in standardized terms, we see larger effects in the smaller 
categories: an increase of one standard deviation in land reform increases the number of plots 
smaller than three ha by 0.219 log units, equivalent to 183 percent of its mean. Standardized effects 
for 3-10 and 10-20 ha/capita are 148 percent and 120 percent of their means, respectively. 
The latifundia interaction term is similarly significant at the five and one percent levels, but 
with signs that change in a way that is telling. The interaction term is positive for all four largest 
size categories – including latifundia – but negative for the two smallest size categories.  
These results imply that land reform increased per capita landholdings across small, medium 
and large landholdings, but most strongly amongst medium-large properties of 20-200 ha. This 
effect is complemented by the latifundia effect above 10 ha/capita, but counteracted below that 
threshold. It is notable that the latifundia effect exceeds the pure land reform effect for the largest 
two categories, both as coefficients and in standardized terms. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc (Log) -0.0200*** -0.0182*** 0.186*** -0.211***
(-0.00674) (-0.00619) (-0.021) (-0.0478)
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc*Latifundia pc (Log) 0.00335 0.00694 -0.0555*** 0.0451
(-0.00551) (-0.00506) (-0.017) (-0.0385)
Constant -2,027 -2,577 16.54*** 16.52
(-4056) (-3723) (-6046) (-13.75)
Interaction Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second degree polynomial of area of municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Proportion allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1628 1628 3164 3164
R-squared 0.02 0.021 0.365 0.082
Number of cod_mpio 814 814 814 814
Panel estimates with municipal and year fixed effects; Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Gini 
Coefficient of 
Plot Sizes
Gini Coefficient 
of Plot Values
Average Size of 
Rural Properties 
(Log)
Coefficient of 
Variation of Plot 
Sizes
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Table 4: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on the Structure of Landholding 
 
Development 
Table 5 examines the effects of land reform and latifundia on municipal-level development, 
measured by the relatively broad measure of Unsatisfied Basic Needs.
11
 Equations 1-3 test 
alternative specifications of our basic model as a robustness check. Land reform is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all three. Once again the land reform-latifundia 
interaction term has the opposite sign, and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Other 
variables behave as expected. 
By decreasing unsatisfied basic needs, land reform is associated with increasing local 
development. A one-log-unit-increase in land reform is associated with a 3.9 unit reduction in UBN. 
To put this in context, a one-standard-deviation increase in land reform would be expected to 
decrease UBN by 5.63 points, equivalent to nine percent of its mean or 37 percent of it standard 
deviation. But once again, these effects are largely undone by concentrated landholdings. A one-
standard-deviation increase in the latifundia interaction term drives UBN back up by 3.3 points, 
equivalent to five percent of its mean, or fifteen percent of its standard deviation. 
                                                 
11
 As compared, for example, to local measures of income per capita or tax receipts. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
<3 ha/capita 
(log)
3-10 
ha/capita 
(log)
10-20 
ha/capita 
(log)
20-200 
ha/capita 
(log)
200-500 
ha/capita 
(log)
>500 
ha/capita 
(log)
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc (Log) 0.150*** 0.212*** 0.164*** 0.322*** 0.0801*** 0.0251
(0.00597) (0.00892) (0.00843) (0.0202) (0.0125) (0.0224)
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc* -0.0339*** -0.0185** 0.0174** 0.0810*** 0.0922*** 0.105***
Latifundia pc (Log) (0.00487) (0.00728) (0.00688) (0.0165) (0.0102) (0.0183)
Constant 6.090* 4.344 -1.540 -11.66 -2.668 11.47*
(3.587) (5.361) (5.064) (12.13) (7.483) (6.645)
Interaction Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second degree polynomial of municipal area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Proportion allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627
R-squared 0.465 0.466 0.427 0.404 0.309 0.126
Number of cod_mpio 814 814 814 814 814 814
Panel estimates with municipal and year fixed effects; Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Table 5: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Development 
 
Summary 
Taken together, our results imply that the effects of land reform in Colombia are not 
symmetric across municipalities, but rather heterogeneous. As theory suggests, the effects of reform 
vary significantly with context. On its own, land reform decreases land inequality, increases average 
plot size, and decreases dispersion in the distribution of land ownership. It does so not by breaking 
up large farms – Colombia’s reform did not work that way – but rather by increasing the lower and 
middle ranges of the distribution. In so doing, it alters that distribution from a bimodal one – with 
peaks at the extremes, a “missing middle”, and a high degree of dispersion – towards a more 
normal, more even distribution. Land reform also improves local development. Impressively, our 
estimates imply that the magnitude of this effect in standardized terms rivals the effect on land 
inequality. Land reform reduces unsatisfied basic needs, a measure of development that naturally 
prioritizes poorer Colombians. This is a notable finding given that any reasonable chain of causality 
would link land reform more tightly to land inequality than to broader, multidimensional measures 
of development. 
But the presence of latifundia – concentrated landholdings – undermines this, reducing land 
reform’s effects on average plot size, number of plots in smaller categories, and development. 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES UBN UBN UBN
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc (Log) -1.733*** -3.857*** -2.942***
(0.467) (0.559) (0.546)
Potential Land Reform-Hectares pc*Latifundia (Log) 2.179*** 1.404***
(0.353) (0.353)
Constant -200.3 78.77*** 226.8
(130.8) (0.773) (177.7)
Average Proportion allocated Yes Yes Yes
Interaction Latifundia*Year No Yes Yes
Polynomial of area*year No No Yes
Second degree polynomial of municipal area No No Yes
Observations 3,260 3,260 3,260
R-squared 0.835 0.824 0.838
Number of cod_mpio 815 815 815
Panel estimates with municipal and year fixed effects; Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
  
31 
These counter-effects are significant in size. Our results imply that latifundia counteracts 59 percent 
of the beneficial effects of land reform on development, and 83 percent of the effect on average plot 
size. It appears that large landowners are able to either prevent the benefits of reform from flowing 
to their intended beneficiaries, or – perhaps – capture these benefits for themselves. 
These results are point estimates at average values for all municipalities. If our overarching 
finding is that pre-existing inequality strongly mediates the effects of land reform, then we need to 
know more. At what thresholds of inequality do land reform’s effects switch from positive to 
negative for the variables we estimate? When does land reform improve inequality and 
development and when does it make things worse? The graphs that follow answer these questions 
by calculating the incremental effects of land reform vs. land concentration separately on 
Colombian municipalities decile by decile. We recalculate our canonical equation using coefficients 
estimated above and decile averages to calculate estimated ŷ values for each decile of Colombian 
municipalities ranked by latifundia. By alternately setting the land reform and the interaction terms 
to zero and subtracting ŷ values, we can easily estimate incremental effects of land reform and 
latifundia on each dependent variable. 
Figure 5 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia, as well as the net 
effect (blue line, discussed above), on the Gini coefficient of land ownership. Land reform 
decreases inequality throughout the distribution, but does so more strongly in the higher deciles of 
land concentration – where the underlying problem it seeks to remedy is greater – as we would 
expect. Latifundia has no effect in the lower deciles, again as we would expect since its value there 
is zero or very low.  But above the 8
th
 decile latifundia has a sharply increasing effect that raises the 
Gini coefficient by 0.011, countering fully half the beneficial effect of land reform. 
Figure 5: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Gini 
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Figure 6 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia on different categories 
of plot sizes. Land reform’s strongest effects are on the smallest size category, <3 ha, quickly 
becoming negative thereafter. But, curiously, the effects of land reform rise above 200 ha, 
approaching zero again for plots above 500 ha. The effects of latifundia, by contrast, are negative 
and small for the smallest plot sizes, but become positive above 10 ha and large above 20 ha. The 
net effect is broadly U-shaped: land reform increases landholding in the smallest and largest 
categories, and reduces in in the middle categories. 
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Figure 6: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on the Structure of Landholding 
  
Figure 7 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia on local development. 
Land reform decreases UBN throughout, thereby increasing development; it does so most strongly 
in the highest deciles, especially the 10th. Latifundia has an almost-mirror image opposite effect, 
initially zero, then rising slowly through decile 7, and accelerating thereafter; by decile 9 latifundia 
counters 85 percent of land reform’s beneficial effect on local development; in decile 10 latifundia 
counters 136 percent of land reform’s beneficial effect. In these municipalities, additional 
increments of land reform decrease inequality by only half as much as elsewhere, and actually 
worsen local development. It is no wonder that a century of land reform has done so little to reduce 
land inequality and poverty rates in Colombia. 
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Figure 7: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Development 
  
How does land reform achieve these effects?  And how does latifundia undo them? Does 
reform affect development by changing the distribution of land assets, assuming the latter is its first-
order effect? Or is there an independent public sector channel, as theory suggests? A number of the 
components of the UBN indicator – especially access to education, water, sanitation, health care, 
and electricity – imply that the public sector must be involved. And does latifundia counteract the 
effects of land reform by intervening in the distribution of land only, or by additionally altering 
public policy and the distribution of public expenditure? Our evidence thus far permits only 
speculation. The next section investigates the channels of land reform’s effects in more detail. 
Mechanisms 
Table 6 explores the effects of land reform and latifundia on municipal-level agriculture 
expenditure. The vast majority of Colombian municipalities are rural, economically dominated by 
agricultural activities.  This is true today, and more true the further back in time we go. Hence 
agricultural policy is quite important for promoting economic and social development; one good 
way to measure this is via local agricultural expenditure. Ideally we would look at other areas of 
expenditure too, but for other sectors data is available for too few municipalities to make this 
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feasible. In addition, a lack of time-series data obliges us to estimate these as cross-sectional 
regressions. Hence we present two measures of agricultural expenditure, each estimated with two 
sets of controls, as robustness checks. Our results are consistent across these specifications. In our 
view, equation 4 is our best model of agricultural expenditure. 
Agriculture expenditure increases with land reform as a proportion of both total expenditure 
and total investment. All our estimates are significant at the one percent level. Hence land reform 
increases agricultural investment measured as a share of the budget. But the presence of 
concentrated landholdings in the form of latifundia once again counters this effect. In all four 
models, the latifundia interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the one and five 
percent levels, with coefficients an order of magnitude smaller than those for land reform. Once 
more, therefore, the latifundia effect reduces that of land reform, decreasing agriculture investment 
where large landholders predominate. Other control variables behave as expected. 
Table 6: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Agricultural Expenditure 
 
How exactly does land reform affect development? Table 7 investigates the effects of land 
reform on disaggregated components of the UBN index. These can be thought of as separating 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Agriculture 
expenditure/
Total 
expenditure
Agriculture 
expenditure/
Total 
investment
Agriculture 
expenditure/
Total 
expenditure
Agriculture 
expenditure/
Total 
investment
Potencial Land Reform-Hectares pc (Log) 0.00174*** 0.00198*** 0.00160*** 0.00180***
(0.000333) (0.000390) (0.000353) (0.000415)
Potencial Land Reform-Hectares pc*Latifundia pc (Log) -0.000488** -0.000572** -0.000489*** -0.000569**
(0.000189) (0.000222) (0.000189) (0.000222)
Constant 0.0806*** 0.0948*** 0.0790*** 0.0923***
(0.0151) (0.0177) (0.0155) (0.0182)
Latifundia (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average area allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial of area Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 752 752 743 743
R-squared 0.182 0.191 0.199 0.208
Cross-sectional OLS; Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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development into private vs. public goods elements. The results show that land reform decreases the 
proportion of people living in overcrowded conditions. Reform also decreases the number of 
households living in structures built with inadequate materials. Reform decreases the population 
with inadequate water, sanitation and electricity services (“public utilities”). And reform decreases 
the proportion of the population that did not attend school. These results are mostly significant at 
the one and five percent levels. 
As before, the presence of latifundia reduces these effects in six of the eight models 
estimated. Latifundia increases the population with inadequate housing, inadequate access to water, 
sanitation and electricity services, and increases the rate of educational non-attendance. Two of 
these coefficients are significant at the one, two at the five, and two at the ten percent levels; 
latifundia is insignificant for overcrowding. Hence land reform on average promotes development 
across both its private and public dimensions, improving housing conditions and access to basic 
services. But the presence of concentrated landholdings counters these beneficial effects for the 
quality of housing materials, access to primary services, and educational non-attendance. Our 
results are robust to changes in specification from varying control variables. 
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Table 7: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Independent UBN Components 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Population	
overcrowded	
(percent)
Population	
overcrowd
ed	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
housing	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
housing	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
public	
utilities	
(percent)	+
Population	
with	
inadequate	
public	
utilities	
(percent)
School	non-
attendance	
(percent)
School	non-
attendance	
(percent)
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc	(log) -1.205** -1.041* -2.841*** -2.037** -6.631*** -4.878*** -1.503*** -0.964**
(0.554) (0.555) (0.866) (0.861) (0.984) (1.046) (0.379) (0.397)
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc* -0.0735 0.185 1.814*** 1.071* 2.394*** 1.622** 0.479* 0.601**
Latifundia	pc	(log) (0.376) (0.394) (0.589) (0.613) (0.700) (0.742) (0.270) (0.281)
Constant 60.98*** 306.9 43.49*** 729.7** 46.64*** 606.1*** 8.820*** 49.37
(0.791) (212.2) (1.234) (329.3) (1.387) (166.5) (0.534) (63.11)
Interaction	Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average	area	allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic	controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial	of	area*year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,090 3,090 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113
R-squared 0.884 0.887 0.640 0.654 0.632 0.638 0.285 0.319
Number	of	cod_mpio 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 806
Panel	estimates	with	municipal	and	year	fixed	effects;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
"Public	utilities"	is	a	composite	of	water,	sanitation	and	electricity	services	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
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6.  Conclusion 
Colombia has pursued land reform since Independence, distributing vast quantities of land 
mainly to landless and poor peasants. What effects did this have on inequality and development? 
These questions are interesting not just for their own sake, but because they shed light on larger 
questions concerning the effects of specific institutional features, such as inequality, on 
development. Our evidence shows that land reform had heterogeneous effects in Colombia. On 
average, land reform increased the size of rural properties, decreased land inequality, decreased 
dispersion in the distribution of landholdings, and reduced poverty. But the presence of latifundia – 
concentrated landholdings – in some municipalities significantly counters these beneficial effects, 
resulting in smaller rural properties, more dispersed landholdings, and lower levels of development. 
By what mechanism did these effects came about? One channel is public policy. Land 
reform increased public investment in important areas such as agriculture, which promotes 
economic growth and well-being. This led to improvements in households’ consumption of private 
goods such as housing, and publicly-provided primary services such as education, health, water and 
sanitation and electricity. But the presence of concentrated land ownership counteracted these 
effects once again, decreasing agriculture expenditure, and worsening outcomes in housing and 
primary services. 
Land reform in Colombia had the intended first-order effects of reducing land inequality and 
dispersion, and placing more land in the hands of poorer farmers. Such changes to a key factor of 
production and the distribution of wealth are important in a developing country with a large 
agricultural sector like Colombia. But it is land reform’s secondary effects – changes in the 
distribution of power, probably by increasing the wealth and status of beneficiaries – that are 
ultimately more important. In many Colombian municipalities, these took the form of long-term 
changes in decision-making and patterns of governance; public institutions reacted as one would 
expect in a democracy, providing more public goods to a wider share of the population, so spurring 
development. 
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Such benign effects followed land reform in municipalities where the initial distribution of 
land – and hence we assume wealth and status – was not highly skewed from the start. But in 
municipalities where land ownership was skewed, elites seem to have succeeded in twisting the 
public policy process such that the benefits of land reform – beginning with the land itself – flowed 
to a smaller, and not larger, share of the population. Inequality and dispersion in the distribution of 
land increased as a result, average plot size fell, and large landholdings increased further in number. 
Municipalities of this type invested less in rural public and private goods, leading to worsening 
indicators of local development. In such places, it is important to note, land was also distributed. 
But it was given out in patterns, leading to broader outcomes, that were very different indeed. 
Land reform reduced land inequality and spurred local development, and so was good for 
Colombia.  But our evidence suggests it could have been better.  In analytical terms – leaving for 
the moment politics aside – it was a mistake not to break up, or at least reduce, latifundia. Doing so 
would likely have had far larger effects in terms of accelerating Colombia’s development. Land 
inequality would have fallen much faster by directly extracting land from the top of the distribution 
and distributing it amongst the bottom.  More potently, the countervailing power of elites, which 
succeeded in reversing the beneficial effects of reform in municipalities across Colombia, would 
have been undermined. Distortion and capture in the political and institutional dynamics through 
which land reform’s more powerful second-order effects flow would have been stymied. And 
Colombians today would be more equal, less poor, and more free. 
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